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The understanding of skilled migration and mobility as competitive is partly a reflection 
of early economic analyses of movements of skilled human capital as a zero-sum game 
(Bhagwati 1979; Bhagwati & Hamada, 1976). Developing counties were considered to 
have their human capital resources depleted by the flows of talented and skilled 
individuals to the developed world, particularly the United States (US House of 
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Representatives, 1977). This led global institutions to focus on net ‘brain gains’ and 
‘brain drains’ in relation to questions of development and fairness (Dickson, 2003; 
Docquier & Rapoport, 2005; InterAcademy Council, 2004; OECD, 2002; Ozden & 
Shiff, 2005; De la Vega, 2005). At the national level, specific policies to try and attract 
and retain scientific researchers have emerged (Laudel 2005; Zweig 2006), entrenching 
the view that scientific mobility, is at least to some extent, a product of competition 
between nations (Johnson & Regets, 1998). 
The zero-sum understanding of human capital mobility has nevertheless been 
challenged by research in a diverse range of fields including innovation studies (Coe & 
Bunnell 2003), labour studies (Williams 2007), national innovation systems analysis 
(Hart 2007) and migration studies (Ackers 2005). Current research into scientific 
mobility also reflects the expanded geographic circulation of talented researchers, 
particularly toward Asia (Goldbrunner et al., 2006; Zweig 2006). The contemporary 
mobility of scientists has come to be understood as both a driver and a consequence of 
processes of organising knowledge production and distribution argued to be both 
increasingly globalised (Mahroum 2000) and diversified (Gibbons et al., 1994; 
Kleinman & Vallas, 2001). Network approaches to the distribution of researchers and 
knowledge have emerged, particularly to highlight linkages between scientists based in 
developed countries and their compatriots in developing ones. This approach argues that 
these inter-connections tend to form “diaspora knowledge networks”, which can 
contribute to solving some of the human resource and economic growth issues 
confronting both poorer and richer countries (Barré et al., 2003; Meyer, 2001; Meyer & 
Wattiaux, 2006; Mahroum & De Guchteneire, 2006). 
Although it is not explicitly discussed in the literature, understandings of mobility as a 
brain-drain/gain phenomenon are grounded in neoclassical conceptions of human 
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capital. No comprehensive and systematic theory of scientific mobility has emerged to 
challenge the zero-sum approach to human capital. This paper is an attempt to progress 
in this direction. We argue that zero-sum approaches to scientific mobility implicitly 
rely on neoclassical economic assumptions concerning the properties of human capital. 
From our perspective, a first theoretical step to make to reflect on alternative ways to 
conceptualise scientific mobility is a systematic reflection on these properties. Indeed, 
thinking about the economics of science and scientific human capital has been 
dominated by the neoclassical economic approach. These models have traditionally 
argued that scientific codified knowledge has the economic properties of a public good. 
It is non-rival, non-appropriable and therefore cannot be efficiently allocated by 
markets. Conversely, human capital is assumed by the theory to have the properties of a 
private good, like any other rival and excludable good, which raises no particular 
challenges for market neoclassical theory.  
Social theory has challenged these assumptions. Callon (1994, 2002) has argued that 
scientific knowledge is not inherently non-rival and non-appropriable and that its 
economic properties are extrinsically determined by the characteristics of the networks 
in which scientists deploy their activities. Bozeman et al. (2001) propose a conceptual 
framework according to which scientific and technical human capital is in part both 
context-dependent and socially configured through network ties. In this paper we review 
the traditional approaches of new growth economics and the economics of science to the 
properties of and scientific human capital. We rely on Callon’s and Bozeman’s 
conceptual developments to propose an analytical framework for the analysis of 
scientific mobility in which scientific human capital is argued to be context-dependent 
and distributed. We propose a distributed approach to scientific human capital mobility 
as opposed to the allocative one that derives from neoclassical premises. Finally, we 
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discuss the implications of the proposed framework to rethink scientists’ mobility from 
a developing country perspective.   
2 The  ‘neoclassical’  economic  properties  of  scientific 
knowledge and human capital 
The economics of science derives from interest in explaining the process of scientific 
knowledge allocation, and how this process relates to economic growth. It builds on 
neoclassical welfare and growth economics and the study of market failure, which 
prevents markets from achieving optimality in resource allocation. According to Arrow 
(1962), the classical reasons for the possible failure of perfect competition are 
indivisibilities, inappropriability and uncertainty. Goods that are efficiently traded in 
markets are private goods: they can be privately produced and allocated; they are 
defined as rival and excludable (or appropriable). Pioneer works by Arrow (1962) and 
Nelson (1959) addressed the particularities of the market for the commodity (good) 
‘knowledge’. They argued that the market for knowledge fails to achieve an optimal 
allocation due to the special properties of this good: knowledge is a non-rival, non-
appropriable (non-excludable), and indivisible good. 
According to both Arrow and Nelson, the non-rivalry of the good ‘knowledge’ is due to 
the fact that the use of certain knowledge by a certain agent does not deprive any other 
agent from using this knowledge simultaneously:  
“The use of existing knowledge by one firm in no way reduces the ability of 
another to use that same knowledge” (Nelson, 1959).  
 
Romer elaborated on Nelson and Arrow in arguing that “rivalry is a purely 
technological attribute” (1990a) of economic goods for which reproduction has a 
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considerable opportunity cost. On the contrary, the reproduction of a non-rival good is 
insignificant compared to the cost of producing the first unit. For example, reproducing 
software will only imply the cost of the tangible support to encrypt the knowledge (disc, 
floppy disc) just as reproducing a mathematical theorem might only imply the cost of a 
photocopy.  
Appropriability or excludability refer to the possibility of the owner of a good 
preventing (excluding) others from using it. Excludability is a function of both 
technology and the legal system. A good such as the code for a computer program can 
be made excludable (or at least partially excludable) by means of a legal system that 
prohibits copying or by means of encryption and copy protection schemes (Romer, 
1990a). However, once a good such as the code for the human genome is made publicly 
available, excluding agents from the use of this information is difficult, if not 
impossible.   
“The cost of transmitting a given body of information is very low […] no 
amount of legal protection can make a thoroughly appropriable commodity of 
something so intangible as information” (Arrow, 1962).  
 
In summary, conventional goods are considered by economic theory to be both rival and 
excludable. They may be privately provided and allocated in competitive markets. In 
contrast, public goods are defined as being non-rival and non-excludable. They can 
neither be privately provided nor traded in markets. Scientific knowledge is assumed by 
growth economics and by the economics of science literature to possess the above 
characteristics of a public good2.  
                                                 
2 The possibility of turning scientific knowledge into a partially excludable good, through institutional 
arrangements or encryption makes Callon (1994) refer to it as a ‘quasi-public good’.  
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The so-called ‘new’ economics of science breaks from the neo-classical conception in 
not seeing ‘scientific knowledge’ as a homogenous good. Rather, the new economics of 
science draws a distinction between ‘codified’ and ‘tacit’ types of scientific knowledge, 
arguing that the processes of the production and diffusion of these types of knowledge 
are distinct and should be treated differently (Foray, 2004). The new economics of 
science defines ‘codified knowledge’ as “information: knowledge reduced and 
converted into messages that can be easily communicated among decision agents” 
(Dasgputa & David, 1994). Codified knowledge, understood as information, can 
therefore be considered relatively inexpensive to reproduce and circulate. It is codified 
knowledge, then, that is argued to have the properties (non-rival and non-excludable) of 
a public good (Dasgupta & David, 1994).  
In contrast, ‘tacit knowledge’, as conceptualised by Polanyi (1966) is non-codifiable, 
relatively difficult and expensive to reproduce and cannot be expressed outside the 
action of the person who has it (Foray, 2004). Tacit knowledge is therefore embodied in 
individuals (or groups of individuals, routines, institutions). It is a form of “knowing by 
doing” (Amin & Roberts, 2008) that cannot be easily circulated. Rather, the transfer of 
tacit knowledge is a process that happens through practice, primarily co-learning in 
collocated activities.  
The allocation of embodied knowledge (including its tacit component) is also assigned 
great relevance by economists in explaining endogenous economic growth (Lucas, 
1988; Romer, 1993). However, it does not raise any particular challenges to neoclassical 
economic theory as it is analytically treated like the allocation of any other private good. 
In the new growth economics tradition, knowledge is incorporated into individuals 
through the variable ‘human capital’ (Nelson & Phelps, 1966; Lucas, 1988), as 
conceptualised by Schultz (1961, 1963) and Becker (1964). Following the human 
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capital theory tradition, knowledge embodied in individuals is basically the result of 
individual decisions to invest in training and education; decisions which are made 
considering the costs of the training and the estimated return on this investment. In this 
theoretical context, agents are perfectly capable of estimating future returns and 
comparing them to interest rates.  
Romer (1993: 72) understands human capital as a good which is “as close to a perfect 
good as one can get”. Romer’s conception of human capital explicitly includes ‘tacit 
knowledge’ such as the “ability to remember the commands of my word processor” 
(1993: 71) or the “ability to add” (1990a: 74). For Romer, human capital is rival 
because the person who possesses these abilities cannot be in more than one place at the 
same time. Additionally, the opportunity cost of reproducing such abilities is not 
negligible: “[t]raining the second person is as costly as training the first” (Romer, 
1990a: 75). According to Romer, rivalry leads to the presumption that human capital is 
also excludable. He argues that a person who possesses a ‘piece of human capital’ can 
perfectly exclude others from benefitting from his or her abilities. Finally, whereas non-
rival goods can be accumulated without limit on a per-capita basis, human capital 
cannot. Each individual can acquire a certain amount of skills. “When this person dies, 
the skills are lost” (Romer, 1990a: 75). As a result, human capital is considered by 
neoclassical economic theory and by the economics of science to have the properties of 
a pure private good. It can therefore be privately produced and traded in markets.  
In summary, whereas scientific knowledge is considered a public good (non-rival & 
non-excludable) and therefore not allocatable through markets, human capital is 
considered rival and excludable (therefore perfectly allocatable). There is thus a tension 
in the literature between the allocation of scientific knowledge in general and of 
scientific human capital resources as knowledge bearing agents, due to the different 
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properties of the knowledge that is circulated in different forms. 
3 A  neoclassical  economic  interpretation  of  scientific 
mobility 
We may now ask ourselves about the implications of the above theoretical premises for 
the analysis of the distribution of human capital in economic and social systems. More 
specifically, we wish to focus on the subgroup of individuals who possess the skills 
needed to produce scientific knowledge and who are devoted to research activities. 
Whether we refer to human capital (new growth economics) or to tacit – embodied 
knowledge (new economics of science) does not affect our reasoning as in both 
frameworks the good is considered to be private (rival and excludable).  
According to this proposition, each scientist (or each individual in a more general 
framework) possesses a certain amount of human capital that might change over time 
through experience and further education and that contributes to the creation of welfare 
(income, further knowledge) only where she/he is located. If human capital is private 
and easily tradable, it should be appropriable by the economic agent that ‘buys’ it, that 
is to say, by employers3.  
The displacement of the person in which ‘a piece of human capital’ is embodied 
therefore implies a re-allocation of this human capital. Human capital may be (re)-
allocated among organisations, countries, sectors, etc, following market and non-market 
forces. When scientists move, their human capital goes along with them. A net outflow 
of scientists from one organisation (or one country) to another implies a human capital 
loss and a net inflow implies a gain. Therefore, whether mobility is international, inter-
sectoral or inter-organisational it can only imply a zero sum game (Bhagwati 1979; 
                                                 
3 The consideration of human capital’s ‘ownership’  raises conceptual problems which do not apply to the 
rest of typical private goods. Section 3 further addresses this issue.  
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Bhagwati & Hamada, 1976) as scientists cannot be physically located in several places 
at the same time, just as it is the case for any type of purely private good. From a 
neoclassical economics perspective, mobility of scientists (as mobility of any other 
piece of human capital) can only be addressed as a (re)-allocation phenomenon, which 
has knowledge cumulative and un-cumulative effects. 
We may apply the terminology of the brain drain-gain literature (Dickson, 2003; 
Docquier & Rapoport, 2005; InterAcademy Council, 2004; OECD, 2002) to the above 
reasoning and say that scientists’ mobility has knowledge drain and knowledge gain 
effects. The term brain drain was used for the first time in 1963 in a report by the Royal 
Society of London, in reference to the exodus of British scientists to the US (Brandi, 
2006). In 1975, the US House of Representatives Committee on International Relations 
examined the question of scientific migration in the context of a study of science, 
technology and American diplomacy. Their Report described the brain drain as an issue 
with three-dimensions: 1) a manpower problem that affects growth patterns in both 
advanced and developing countries; 2) a development problem that “deprives the 
developing nations of much need human capital for achieving their major national goal, 
namely, modernization”; and 3) a science and technology problem related to the 
“management of resources and the building of infrastructure for modern industrial 
societies” (US HoR: 1977: 1048).  
Since then, the concern for the negative consequences of scientists’ emigration has been 
accentuated, especially in countries that register high outflow levels (De la Vega, 2005; 
Morano Foadi, 2006). The interest in understanding the features and consequences of 
these migratory flows for the countries of origin and destination has given rise to an 
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abundance of literature4. Some of these studies have focused particularly on the 
relationship between the migration of professionals and technological change in the US 
(North, 1995; Ash & Söllner, 2002; Saxenian, 2002) and other countries (Saxenian, 
2002, 2006; Saxenian & Hsu, 2001).  
Public policies aimed at obtaining net positive inflows of researchers are consistent with 
the neoclassical theoretical view of the world. The Mobility Strategy for the European 
Research Area (CEC, 2001) is in part an example of this type of policy as it counts 
among its objectives the retention of researchers in Europe, the attraction of third-
country researchers to the European Union and the encouragement of return of 
European researchers based outside the EU. We will refer to this set of objectives as 
‘retain-attract-return’ policies.  
This interpretation of the mobility phenomenon at the international scale, together with 
policies targeted at ‘retaining and attracting’ scientists lead to a ‘global competition for 
talent’ (Kapur & McHale, 2005) in which necessarily winners and losers appear. Labour 
markets are assumed to operate on an international scale and scientists respond to 
market signals by searching for the best job opportunities.  
We argue that the brain-drain gain approach to scientific mobility and the policies that 
derive from this approach strongly rely on the neoclassical economic framework 
assumptions; that is to say on a theoretical construction in which knowledge embodied 
in individuals is treated as an intrinsically rival, appropriable and excludable good. A 
reconsideration and transformation of these assumptions has potentially important 
implications for the interpretation of the scientific mobility phenomenon. We will rely 
on social theory to argue that the economic properties of scientific human capital are not 
                                                 
4 For a review of the literature on the international migration of qualified human resources see Gaillard 
and Gaillard (1998a). Brandi (2006b) studies the historical evolution of the international migration of 
qualified human resources from the Middle Ages to the beginning of the 21st century.  
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necessarily those assumed by the economic neoclassical framework. The following 
section takes a first step in that direction pointing out a major difference between human 
capital and typical private goods. 
4 The  economic  properties  of  human  capital:  an 
unresolved discussion 
According to Callon (2002: 284), the proponents of the new economics of science 
(Dasgputa & David, 1994) agree to consider embodied knowledge as a rival good: “A 
research director who recruits a scientist removes him or her from the market, for no 
other laboratory can employ him or her”. However, in a previous paper (1994) he 
recognises certain differences between economists on this point and refers to the skills 
incorporated in human beings as non-rival goods: “Mobilizing the skills and techniques 
of an expert does not prevent another expert from mobilizing the same skills at the same 
time” (1994: 401). 
The two statements are not necessarily inconsistent for the perspective used to address 
rivalry is different in each case. The later (2002) approach considers rivalry from the 
laboratory or organisation perspective: the skills of a scientist employed in a laboratory 
are inaccessible to another laboratory. In this case ‘the good’ is the skills embodied in a 
specific person. However, the earlier approach considers rivalry from the individual 
perspective: ‘the good’ is simply the skills. It is true that nothing necessarily prevents 
one person from developing exactly the same skills as another. Whilst it is very unlikely 
that a tennis player develops exactly the same skills as Rafael Nadal it is not impossible. 
In contrast, for Romer (1993: 71) the human capital good is “the set of connections 
between neurons”. Human capital incorporates skill sets, including generic skills, but 
Romer seems to imply that these skills are intrinsically a property of individual persons 
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and are not identically reproduced. This is why, as discussed earlier, for Romer human 
capital is indisputably rival: “There is no way for anyone to take advantage of my 
ability to remember commands for my word processor without getting my permission 
[…] because there is also no way for many people to make use of my ability at the same 
time it [human capital] is as rival good” (1993: 71, italics added). The individual is thus 
the ‘owner’ of human capital goods that are intrinsic to that person and perfectly 
excludable. 
As these varying perspectives illustrate, dealing with the economic properties of human 
capital is anything but a simple task. Although eventually tradable in markets, embodied 
skills are very different to typical private exchangeable goods. The consideration of 
human capital’s ‘ownership’ raises important conceptual problems that the economic 
literature has not addressed. When discussing excludability or appropriability a 
distinction needs to be made between the ‘buyer’s’ perspective (the organisation that 
employs the person in which the human capital is embodied) and the ‘owner’s’ 
perspective (the person in which the human capital is embodied). In the case of a typical 
private good the agent who purchases it in the market becomes the owner. In labour 
markets, employers acquire the right to benefit from their employees’ embodied 
competences but they do not own the human capital they deploy.  
Romer’s approach is that of the owner’s perspective. The perfect privateness of the 
good human capital derives from the fact that the owner has total control over the use of 
the individual’s abilities: noone can use them without permission, noone can steal them. 
Human capital is therefore more perfectly private than other goods (i.e. a floppy disk) 
that can actually be stolen from the owner (1993: 72).  
However, if we approach rivalry, appropriability and excludability from an employer’s 
perspective the conclusions will be different. First, although it is undeniable that the 
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same person cannot be physically located in two places simultaneously, this is not 
enough to derive definitive conclusions concerning the ‘privateness’ of her human 
capital, for an organisation is not necessarily capable of fully appropriating her 
embodied skills. The possibility of an organisation excluding others from accessing 
those skills will depend on a multiplicity of factors, which include institutional and 
organisational arrangements, and the person’s (the owner’s) will. The possibility of 
other organisations benefitting from those skills is therefore not a priori determined.  
If organisations are not fully able to appropriate and control the human capital 
embodied in the scientists they hire, is it possible to state that human capital is a 
perfectly private (therefore rival-excludable) good?  If we adopt the buyer’s perspective, 
what are the factors that actually determine the degree of rivalry, appropriability and 
excludability of scientific human capital? We argue that these are important questions 
that need to be addressed in order to understand certain dynamics affecting the 
production and diffusion of scientific knowledge. In particular, reconsideration of the 
economic properties of human capital alters the conceptual background and hence the 
interpretative framework for understanding scientific mobility.  
As discussed in section 2, in a context in which scientific human capital is considered 
fully rival and appropriable, mobility can only be addressed as an allocative 
phenomenon implying zero-sum knowledge drain and gain effects. Non-rivalr and non-
appropriable scientific human capital may however lead to other effects, which are not 
typically addressed by the theory, but which may be of major relevance for economic 
development. The following section considers two ‘distributed’ models, one of 
scientific research (Callon) and one of scientific and technical human capital (Bozeman 




Callon (1994) states that, according to economic theory, human capital has certain 
‘intrinsic’ properties that turn it into a private good. Callon makes a general argument 
that scientific knowledge (meaning codified scientific knowledge) is not necessarily 
non-rival and non-appropriable, as assumed by economic theory. He states that the 
properties of ‘codified knowledge’ are not inherent to ‘the good’ (the codified 
knowledge) but are extrinsically configured. He argues that this has major consequences 
for the conceptualisation of the dynamics of scientific research and the replication of 
knowledge. In this section we apply Callon’s (1994, 2002) argument concerning the 
economic properties of codified scientific knowledge to scientific human capital to 
show that the economic properties of human capital are configured by their network. 
Secondly, we use Bozeman’s et al. (2001) conceptual approach to scientific and 
technical human capital to highlight that the economic properties of human capital are 
also socially configured. In different ways, these two approaches prompt us to re-
evaluate human capital’s economic properties as context-dependent and distributed. 
5.1 Rethinking  human  capital’s  properties  from  Callon’s 
socioeconomics of scientific research 
Callon (1994) addresses the question of to what extent science – meaning codified 
scientific knowledge – can be considered an inherently public good (non-rival and non-
appropriable) as assumed by neoclassical economists. Callon argues from a position 
within sociological studies of science that understands the fabrication of scientific 
knowledge as a messy and irreducibly social process (Barnes, 1982). He argues that in 
order to use a codified statement produced by an agent, other agents must undertake a 
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series of investments5 without which the knowledge has no use. This he refers to as ‘the 
thesis of the intrinsic inutility of statements’ (Callon, 1994: 403). In other words, 
codified knowledge such as a scientific paper has no use in and of itself, it is useful only 
when it can be read and understood and deployed as part of processes of knowledge 
production and or dissemination. 
Callon’s starting point for what he terms ‘a socio-economics of scientific research’ is 
“the replication of knowledge” (2002: 287). In making the object of analysis the 
‘replication of knowledge’, he argues that the diffusion of basic scientific knowledge 
cannot be subsumed under the exchange of codified statements as information “because 
it is not statements that are duplicated but laboratories: consequently basic science 
cannot be reduced to information” (2002: 288). In other words, whilst concepts can be 
circulated in the form of information, this is only part of the work of ‘replication’. 
The replication of knowledge depends on what Callon terms “the set [statement + 
instruments + embodied competences]” (Callon 2002: 289). Following the work of 
Collins (1974), Callon assumes that the elements of ‘the set’ cannot be mobilised 
independently of each other (1994: 403). Therefore the work of replicating knowledge 
is equally dependent upon the availability and transporting of the requisite material 
devices and on access to the competences required to set up, calibrate and use this 
equipment. 
The degree of non-rivalry of a statement (which refers to the unlimited possibility for all 
agents to use it once it has been produced) thus depends on the amount of investment 
needed to develop the skills and acquire the instruments that make it useful in a certain 
context. “Non-rivalry is in no way an intrinsic property of the statements themselves: it 
                                                 
5 Reproduction investments, investments in acquiring and maintaining complementary assets (i.e. 
instruments, embodied skills, know how), and investments in the mobilisation of the codified statement 
(Callon, 1994: 404-405) 
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would be better to call it an extrinsic property and to consider the variable degrees of 
(non) rivalry” (Callon, 1994: 406). 
Callon acknowledges that ‘the thesis of the intrinsic inutility of statements’ can be 
equally applied to skills and instruments (1994: 403). Although he does not expressly 
extend the argument to the economic properties of human capital, he provides the 
theoretical bases to make this step. We may argue that the possibility of agents 
(organisations and individuals) using what Romer would call ‘a piece of human capital’ 
depends on the availability of the complementary assets required (instruments and 
statements). The artistic capabilities of a great pianist are of little use in an environment 
lacking pianos and sheetmusic, for example. In other words, the utility of human capital 
is context dependent. The amount of investment required to gain access to, and 
understand, codified scientific knowledge and appropriate instrumentation thus 
determines the degree of (non-)rivalry of human capital. 
If the economic properties of human capital are extrinsically determined it is the nature 
of the context that ascribes the degree of rivalry and excludability. Callon explains this 
in terms of the structure of networks in which scientific knowledge is produced. The 
notion of ‘network’ refers to ‘translation networks’: “a compound reality in which 
inscriptions…technical devices and human actors…are brought together and interact 
with each other. The networks vary in length and complexity” (Callon, 1995: 52). He 
argues that the degree of rivalry and excludability of codified scientific knowledge “is 
closely correlated to the form and state of the networks concerned” (1994: 313). 
In ‘consolidated networks’ “competences and instruments have been duplicated in 
multiple copies and widely distributed” (Callon, 2002: 290) All the required 
complementary assets are available at each ‘equivalent’ node in the network. In such 
consolidated configurations a relatively extensive ‘space of circulation’ is elaborated, 
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knowledge flows comparatively easily and is relatively difficult to appropriate. Callon 
argues that in consolidated networks the economic properties of statements are closer to 
those of a theoretical public good. We can apply this argument also to scientific human 
capital: within a consolidated network in which scientists already share a codified 
knowledge base, a modus operandi, types of infrastructure and instrumentation, etc, 
there is an extended space of circulation for human capital which is therefore relatively 
non-rival (easy to circulate and reproduce). 
On the other hand, in ‘emergent networks’ codified scientific knowledge more closely 
resembles a private good, according to Callon (2002). This knowledge is less easily 
reproducible and usable than is the case in ‘consolidated configurations’. When new 
research findings and networks emerge, the number of actors sharing the use of 
common sets of skills, codified knowledge and instruments is by definition limited. 
Emergent findings remain easily or inexpensively appropriable within the localised 
setting as it is “easy to take ownership of a good that nobody understands and that has 
no utilitity outside its place of production” and “contrary to the traditional view, leaks 
and overflows are costly to organize” (Callon, 2002: 290). It is therefore more rival and 
excludable (Callon 2002). Again, we may apply the same reasoning to human capital. 
Mobility of human capital with relatively scarce (emergent) embodied competences 
would “presuppose the existence of a circulation space that does not yet exist” (Callon, 
2002: 290). If no space for the circulation of skills yet exists, it is comparatively easy 
for organisations to exclude others from the overflowing of their human capital and 
more costly for others to try and reproduce those skills. 
The economic properties of scientific human capital are also defined as extrinsically 
configured and dependent on the contexts in which it is deployed. Using Callon’s words 
we may state that these properties depend on the structure of the networks involved: in 
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emergent networks human capital resembles a relatively private good; in consolidated 
networks it tends to be less rival and excludable6. In the following section we look at 
Bozeman’s conception of scientific and technical human capital (STHC), to point out 
how in this framework the properties of human capital are similarly context dependent, 
but also socially and relationally defined. 
5.2 Social  and  contextualised  human  capital:  the  ‘scientific  and 
technological human capital’ approach 
Bozeman et al. (2001) build on social and economic theory to broaden the traditional 
neoclassical approach to human capital. According to Bozeman et al. (2001: 721) 
standard human capital theory regards the human being as 
“a knowledge delivery mechanism into which inputs are added in the form of 
education and training and outputs are received in units of productivity, higher 
earnings and expanding economic growth. It is the emphasis on the value of 
knowledge creation, recombination, transformation and application process that 
is missing. The process that takes place within the black box is inherently 
social…and is missing from the theory”.7 
 
Scientific and technical human capital (STHC) is defined as the sum of scientific, 
technical and social knowledge embodied in a particular individual. More specifically it 
is composed by internal and external resources. Internal resources are classified into 
three overlapping categories: cognitive skills (not determined by the context, i.e. 
memory, mathematical reasoning), substantive scientific and technical knowledge 
                                                 
6 In section 4 we named the perspective we are using to discuss these properties ‘the buyer’s approach’.  
7 It is interesting to note the different approach to human capital that Romer (1992) and Bozeman (2008) 
do. For Romer, the process that takes place within the ‘black box’ is purely neuronal whereas for 
Bozeman it is inherently social. Both approaches are undoubtedly compatible as neuronal connections can 
be determined or conditioned by social interactions. However, putting the stress on the social process that 
leads to human capital formation and the conditions for its use leads us to reconsider its economic 
attributes which for Romer are clearly those of a purely private good.  
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(basically obtained through formal scientific education and training) and context skills 
(gained by doing, usually tacit knowledge acquired through design and implementation 
of specific research plans) (Bozeman et al., 2001: 726). External resources are the social 
capital that scientists bring to their work. They are embedded in network ties. Since the 
production of scientific knowledge is by definition collective and social, many of the 
skills are more social or political than cognitive (Bozeman et al., 2001: 727-728). 
The human and social capital components of STHC are both important for our 
argument. The STHC framework classifies so-called ‘internal resources’ (human 
capital) into three overlapping categories: cognitive skills, substantive scientific and 
technical knowledge and context skills. According to Bozeman et al., 
context skills are usually tacit and are obtained through experience in specific 
research settings. They cannot be directly brought to new scientific and technical 
problems, but they provide the basis for problem solving heuristics and comprise 
an action repertoire, which is transferable to other contexts (2001: 727).  
 
The distinction between specific localised context skills and the generic action 
repertoire of science is central to understanding the economic properties of human 
capital. Whilst the two types of context skills are inculcated simultaneously in practice, 
we would argue that localised context skills are particularly rival and appropriable for 
they are difficult (and costly) to reproduce and transfer to different contexts. 
Conversely, generic skills and problem solving aptitudes are part of the “background 
knowledge” (Zellner, 2003) of science that is routinely and systematically reproduced 
and disseminated. These skills comprise an aspect of the professional habitus of 
scientists (Bourdieu, 1975) and are relatively non-rival and are not appropriable.  
This argument seems consistent with the approach taken by Callon (2002). If we 
consider ‘context skills’ in relation to Callon’s description of emergent and consolidated 
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networks, it seems reasonable to assume that in a ‘consolidated configuration’, where 
scientists share a common knowledge base and action repertoire (including the use of a 
set of instruments and statements), a relatively extensive space of circulation exists. 
From the ‘buyers perspective’ the properties of human capital being circulated are 
relatively non-rival and non-appropriable. Alternatively, localised context skills seem 
comparable to emergent embodied capabilities for which there is a restricted circulation 
space. Human capital in such emergent configurations or localised contexts is a 
relatively rival and appropriable good. 
However, STHC also includes the additional component of “social capital”, here 
conceptualised “as the cooperative glue that binds collaborators together in knowledge 
exchange”, (Bozeman et al., 2001: 723). Social capital includes the resources that 
connect scientists with their colleagues, funding agencies, other laboratories, firms, etc. 
Unlike human capital as traditionally conceptualised by economic theory, which resides 
in the ‘connection between neurons’ within the brain of its owner and is therefore 
explicitly individualized, Bozeman et al. argue that ‘social human capital’ “inheres in 
relations between people and therefore cannot itself be owned” (Bozeman et al., 2001: 
723).  
In other words and following Bozeman’s statements we could say that ‘social capital’ is 
embedded in external relationships and therefore inherently inappropriable. 
Furthermore, Bozeman et al. (2001: 723) argue that “the interplay between social and 
human capital is so fundamental, intimate and dynamic that neither concept is fully 
meaningful by itself, making it nearly impossible in the end to pinpoint where one 
leaves off and the other one picks up”. There is thus an inherently inappropriable 
component of STHC which is not easily distinguishable from the other components. 
The social dimension of STHC is thus by definition inappropriable (non-excludable) 
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and embedded in network ties. It is logical to derive from this that the degree of 
inappropriability of the STHC associated to a certain scientist will depend to some 
extent on the characteristics and configuration of these social networks. There is thus an 
important difference between Callon’s and Bozeman’s conceptualisation of ‘networks’. 
However, these differences do not have major implications in terms of our argument, as 
both analytical frameworks permit us to derive the conclusion that the degree of 
appropriability of scientific human capital is externally (extrinsically/socially) and not 
internally (intrinsically/individually) determined.  
One of the major contributions of the STHC framework is the categorisation of 
embodied scientific skills into different types, which are closely and dynamically linked 
to each other. Moreover, the theory states that the composition of an individual’s STHC 
is constantly reconfigured over time (Bozeman et al. 2001: 727). We may thus derive 
some conclusions concerning the economic properties of STHC. On the one hand, these 
properties will depend on the individual’s composition of STHC at a certain analytical 
instant: for example the more important the social skills and relationships, the less 
appropriable her STHC will be. On the other hand, we may argue that the more 
important localised context skills are during a particular period, the more rival and 
excludable the STHC will be. The balance of these components is dynamic and 
transforms over time in the course of a scientific career. The economic properties of 
STHC are therefore not constant over time. 
We rely thus on Callon’s and Bozeman’s conceptual developments to propose an 
analytical framework for the analysis of scientific mobility in which scientific human 
capital is not considered as an a-priori perfect private good (as implicitly assumed in the 
literature on brain-drain). On the contrary, we argue that the economic properties of 
human capital change over time depending on its skills-type composition and that these 
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properties are extrinsically determined by the characteristics of the networks in which 
scientists deploy their activities. The economic properties of human capital are thus 
argued to be context dependent and distributed. These premises have important 
implications for the assessment of scientific mobility, which we develop in the 
following section. 
 
6 Reconceptualising  human  capital  mobility:  from  an 
allocative to a distributed human capital model 
We have argued that scientific human capital should not be conceptualized as simply a 
private good, as defined by economic theory. Scientific human capital allocation should 
therefore not be considered a theoretically equivalent problem to the allocation of apples 
in markets. Relying on social theory we come to the conclusion that the economic 
properties of scientific human capital are shaped (and re-shaped) by the contexts and 
networks in which it is deployed. These properties thus transform as contexts and 
networks change. The neoclassical economic framework does not permit us to deal 
analytically with this substantial complexity because it is designed to explain allocation 
of economic goods that are assumed to have a priori invariable properties. In order to 
deal theoretically with variable and evolving economic properties we need to move 
from the allocative economic neoclassical model to a broader conceptual approach that 
allows us to integrate the temporally, spatially and socially ‘distributed’ nature of 
scientific human capital. 
The re-conceptualization of the economic properties of scientific human capital has 
major implications for how we understand and evaluate its production, use and diffusion 
in science systems. As discussed in section 2, in the standard neoclassical approach 
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human capital can be allocated in markets like any other private good and is equally 
usable in every context. From this perspective, the mobility of scientists can only be 
understood as a re-allocation process through which human capital units are transferred 
among organizations leading to ‘brain-drain’ and ‘brain-gain’ effects. We argue 
however that a ‘distributed’ approach means that: 1) the mobility of scientists is 
conceived as a process integral to the production and circulation of all scientific 
knowledge; 2) human capital mobility (re-)configures scientific networks; and 3) the 
context dependent and varying economic properties of scientific human capital 
influence both the role and the effects of mobility, which in turn may modify these 
properties. The following paragraphs outline the theoretical bases of these arguments. 
Section 5.1 established that human capital is fundamental to the replication of scientific 
knowledge as a key component of “the set” that is replicated: [statement + instruments 
+ embodied competences]” (Callon 2002: 289). However, the mobility of scientists is a 
non-substitutable element of the replication process, especially in the case of emerging 
scientific knowledge. In the case of new or ‘emergent’ research findings, Callon argues 
that 
“there is only one copy of this package and the first replication implies its total 
duplication in a way that is entirely comparable to the (re)production of a normal 
good such as an automobile or a lemon squeezer. On the basis of its physical 
characteristics, it is thus appropriable at a small cost” (2002: 289). 
 
The replication of the emergent research thus involves duplication of ‘the set’, which 
given the localised conditions of its (re)production is, at this point, actually an easily 
appropriable and hence rival good. If the same human capital, manipulate the same 
instruments using the same codified instruction then the findings can be most easily 
duplicated. ‘The set’ is intact and the operations can be simply repeated. However, this 
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we might call ‘repetition’ and see that there is virtually no addition cost involved in 
duplication. 
The difference between ‘repetition’ and the ‘replication of knowledge’ is that 
replication involves movement, the transporting of elements from “one setting to 
another” (Pickering 2005). If we consider the components of ‘the set’ (and we are 
talking specifically about new or emergent findings here), the codified knowledge 
(statement) that is developed can be easily reproduced and circulated to a different 
space and into the hands of different human capital (for example through priority claim 
journal articles). The material devices (instruments) can also be industrially 
manufactured and reproduced in time and, even if customised to some extent or 
fabricated on site, can in all likelihood be duplicated precisely by competent engineers 
and installed in different locations (this, of course, also depends on the physical size and 
financial investments required). 
However, in emerging configurations embodied competences are not substitutable by 
either other components of ‘the set’ or by a simple replacement human capital. 
According to Callon therefore, the “more original the findings or, in other words, the 
scarcer the embodied competences that accompany them, the higher the costs of their 
reproduction because it cannot simply be amputated from all the other elements that 
form a whole” (2002: 289). As discussed above, embodied competences are context 
dependent, specifically when dealing with new discoveries and original findings. In 
addition, embodied knowledge, including its non-codifiable tacit dimension, has to be 
transferred between individuals or teams, acquired in the realm of demonstration and 
practice from those who are competent. 
Callon argues that the transporting of embodied competences would “presuppose the 
existence of a circulation space that does not yet exist. It is easy to take ownership of a 
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good that nobody understands and that has no utility outside its place of production” 
(Callon 2002: 290). In emergent configurations the mobility of human capital is thus 
essential to the replication of scientific knowledge. A space of circulation cannot be 
established without human capital mobility, whether through the movement of the 
holder of scarce embodied competences to establish new ‘equivalent’ nodes, or via the 
circulation through the localised context where these embodied competences originated 
and can be transferred. Scientific human capital is under these circumstances highly 
rival and appropriable but remains transferrable to another context only when 
accompanied by the necessary investments to replicate “the set”. If these investments 
are not undertaken, mobility may even lead to a ‘negative-sum game’ in which neither 
the sending institution nor the receiving one can benefit from the displaced human 
capital. However, once replication has become multiple and a well-defined space of 
circulation established, embodied competences can be easily ‘inserted’ and human 
capital is relatively interchangable. Scientific human capital is less rival in this context 
(less costly to reproduce) but also less appropriable. Spillovers are common. Under 
these circumstances, mobility may eventually lead to ‘positive-sum games’ in which 
several organisations succeed in benefiting from the same human capital. However, this 
stage cannot be reached without the prior extension of the circulation space. Scientific 
human capital mobility is hence not an epiphenomenon, it is a fundamental process 
underlying the production and diffusion of scientific knowledge. 
A second point following from the fundamental significance of human capital mobility 
for scientific knowledge generation is that the movement of scientists re-configures 
networks. Human capital and complementary assets (statements, instruments) are 
assembled in localised research sites. The mobility of human capital shapes, and is 
shaped by, investment in complementary assets and their utilisation. When scientists 
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move networks alter and arrangements of human capital and complementary assets are 
transformed. Scientific mobility may lengthen or link networks to extend consolidated 
configurations (capacity building) or contribute to the establishment of emergent nodes. 
Scientific human capital mobility can also have a ‘domino effect’, leading to chains of 
movement through spaces of circulation. Human capital mobility is thus a fundamental 
and dynamic process shaping the evolution of scientific networks over time. 
The third related point is that the mobility of scientists has consequences for the 
economic properties of human capital. As we described in detail, above, the economic 
properties of scientific human capital are context dependent and extrinsically 
determined. One consequence of the movement of scientists is the potential 
transformation in the degree of rivalry and excludability of their human capital. The 
mobility of human capital is therefore not a question of the simple allocation of a rival 
good. Rather, scientific mobility may alter the degree of rivalry of human capital as 
networks are re-configured and different co-efficients of relatively specific or generic 
context skills are deployed in scientific work. In addition, scientists’ networks of social 
capital that are integral to the collective nature of their work may be differently utilised 
and leveraged subsequent to changes in organisational or geographic locations. A 
scientist’s embodied skills and tacit knowledge may become relatively more or less 
rival when transferred from one setting to another. 
7 Discussion: scientific mobility and development 
A distributed approach to scientific human capital mobility has important implications 
for how we conceive the role of mobility in capacity building processes. For example, 
the emigration of a scientist from a developing science system to a highly developed 
one (traditionally considered as a knowledge/brain drain) could stabilise or further 
strengthen the participation of her country of origin in internationally consolidated 
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configurations, thus contributing to multidirectional knowledge transfer and to the 
reinforcement of her home country science system (capacity building). By the same 
token, the repatriation of a researcher involved in experimental emerging research 
abroad, if not well managed, could turn into a lose-lose situation in which neither the 
laboratory of origin, nor the home country, could capture the value embodied in 
scientific human capital once separated from the context in which the relatively new 
knowledge is emerging and developing. Policies designed to attract researchers to return 
are thus argued to need to consider whether the scientific human capital is deployed in 
relatively emergent or consolidated networks. From this perspective the role of public 
policies would no longer be to build ‘markets’ able to attract and retain scientists but to 
observe and support the process of network (re)configuration. 
The socioeconomics approach to scientific mobility we propose argues that mobility, 
like knowledge production, is not context free. Every scientist ‘owns’ particular co-
efficients of specific and generic context skills that enable them to create and innovate 
in seeking new knowledge, but which are also part of their scientific habitus that allows 
them to adapt to localised scientific settings as part of their professional capability. 
Specific and generic skills cannot necessarily be treated as equivalent in relation to the 
economic properties of scientific human capital. 
From the buyer’s perspective, for example that of a company or a developing country, a 
socioeconomics of scientific mobility thus requires three levels of analysis. Firstly, an 
understanding needs to be developed of the extent to which mobility reconfigures 
networks in which the buyer has an interest. Secondly, to what extent do these 
reconfigurations, and the emergent compatibilities between context skills and research 
settings, transform the economic properties of scientific human capital in which the 
buyer makes investments. Finally, such an approach should then consider the 
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institutional and policy arrangements that ‘frame’ this process and their historical 
evolution. Public policy that invests in scientific human capital as part of a well-
informed strategy to build and reinforce spaces of circulation that meet particular 
economic and development goals (innovation, commercialization, capacity-building) 
has the potential to better advance the interests of developing countries than trying to 
compete for human capital resources viewed as homogenous goods allocated as part of 
a zero-sum game. 
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